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1 Introduction 
The debate about whether traditional ethical theories in 
normative ethics (consequentialism, contractualism, 
Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, etc.) should be understood as 
criteria of rightness or as decision procedures goes back to 
1730s.1 When these theories are understood as decision 
procedures, they are taken to provide a sequence of 
deliberative steps such that, when you are guided by them 
in reasoning, you make practical decisions as you ought to. 
In contrast, a criterion of rightness is ‘a statement of 
conditions under which actions are morally right’ (Shafer-
Landau 2010, 130). Such a statement is either neutral about 
deliberation or it instructs us to follow certain rules of 
thumb.    
Like most ethicists, I used to think that the latter view is 
more plausible, because ethical theories appear to be bad 
decision procedures by their own lights: they seem ‘self-
defeating’ or ‘self-effacing’. This is most familiar in the case 
of consequentialism. Thinking about what options you 
have, their potential outcomes, how likely those outcomes 
are, how much value they contain, and then calculating is 
difficult, burdensome and unlikely to result in a good 
outcome.2  
Other theories suffer from similar problems. A virtuous, 
flourishing agent does not consider the example of an agent 
who has the character-traits that enable her to be successful 
in the activities that are characteristic to human beings. 
Likewise, the requirement to consider what kind of 
principles could guide a situation, what kind of standpoints 
 
1 See Butler (1736: para. 8). For a list of discussions, see Brink (1989, 216 
fn. 4). 
2 See Mill (1861, ch. 2, para. 24), Sidgwick (1907, 413 and 489–90), and 
Parfit (1984, 24–9 and 31–43).  
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they create to individuals, and what kind of objections 
those individuals could make could be reasonably rejected 
due to how burdensome it would be. And, I doubt that an 
agent could constitute herself as a practically efficient agent 
by frequently considering what would happen if everyone 
adopted her maxims and whether willing such a scenario 
would lead to contradictions in her will. 
I have also had two other reasons to reject the deliberation 
procedure alternative. Firstly, when students rely on ethical 
theories in answering difficult ethical questions, the results 
are invariably awkward. In contrast, when applied ethicists 
provide compelling arguments for their views on different 
issues, these arguments rarely rely on ethical theories. If 
ethical theories were good deliberation procedures, you 
would expect both (i) that students would get better results 
by applying them and (ii) that applied ethicists would at 
least sometimes need to make use of them.  
Finally, consider Henry Sidgwick’s main argument in The 
Methods of Ethics (1907). Sidgwick explicitly understood 
three ethical theories (egoistic hedonism, the common-
sense morality of many basic moral duties, and 
utilitarianism) as methods of ethics – as ways ‘by which we 
determine what individual human beings ‘ought’ … to do’ 
(Sidgwick 1907, 1). He then used four tests to determine 
whether these methods could provide self-evident truths 
rather than mere opinions. The propositions provided by a 
method that passed Sidgwick’s tests were required to be (i) 
formulated in clear and precise terms, (ii) stable in careful 
reflection, (iii) mutually consistent, and (iv) generally 
agreed upon (Sidgwick 1907, 338–42). Sidgwick then 
argued that the pluralist common-sense method fails these 
tests whereas egoistic hedonism and utilitarianism pass 
them. This led him to endorse dualism of practical reason – 
the idea that there are two equally defensible but 
conflicting ways to make decisions (Sidgwick 1907, 496–
507).  
I have always found the previous argument problematic. 
There are, of course, well-known issues with whether 
Sidgwick chose the right tests for determining whether the 
methods provide self-evident propositions and with his 
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conclusions concerning which methods pass those tests.3 
Yet, I have always been sceptical about Sidgwick’s starting 
point – the idea that ethical theories should be evaluated as 
deliberation procedures. More precisely, Sidgwick seemed 
to draw conclusions about which actions are right (i.e., 
about the correct criterion of rightness) on the basis of 
evaluating deliberation procedures, for example, in terms 
of their ability to garner widespread agreement. This 
seemed akin to drawing metaphysical conclusions on the 
basis of epistemic considerations. 
I have recently, however, changed my mind: perhaps we 
should think of ethical theories as something like decision 
procedures – as methods to be used in moral inquiry.4 This 
chapter describes the line of reasoning that led me to revise 
my view.  
I begin from recent developments in the understanding of 
consequentialism. §2 outlines how the so-called 
‘consequentializers’ have suggested that consequentialism 
is a flexible framework in which different first-order ethical 
views can be formulated as versions of consequentialism. 
§3 then suggests that other ethical theories too could be 
understood as equally flexible frameworks. For reasons of 
space, it focuses on T.M. Scanlon’s (1998) contractualism. 
§4 considers the consequences of the thought that many 
ethical theories are equally flexible and thus able to capture 
different first-order ethical views as their versions. It argues 
that, in this situation, we cannot decide which ethical 
theory is correct on extensional basis as there will be a 
version of each theory that is equally extensionally 
adequate. I then suggest that, as a result, ethical theories 
should be understood as methods to be used for solving 
difficult moral problems. I also outline a form of pluralist 
pragmatism as a guiding principle for theory choice in 
normative ethics. Different ethical theories can make 
 
3 See Hurka (2014, ch. 7). 
4 Below, I discuss deliberation procedures and methods of ethics 
interchangeably. Deliberation procedures are sometimes understood as 
algorithms that are simple to apply, whereas methods are thought of as 
some less straightforward ways of moral reasoning. In these terms, my 
thesis is that ethical theories should be understood as methods even if 
they cannot provide deliberation procedures.  
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themselves valuable by providing useful ways for thinking 
about difficult ethical questions, but it need not be that the 
same ethical theory works best in every case. 
2 The Consequentializing Project 
The flexibility of consequentialism has become evident 
through the so-called ‘consequentializing project'.5 I will 
stipulate that any ethical theory that has the following 
structure is a version of consequentialism (Suikkanen 2020, 
262):6 
Options: In any situation, there is a set of all the 
mutually exclusive actions you could do. They 
constitute your options. 
Evaluative: Your options in a choice-situation can be 
ranked in terms of how good their consequences are. 
Deontic: Which actions are right and wrong is a 
function of the evaluative ranking of your options. 
Classical utilitarianism is a version of consequentialism 
thus understood (see Mill 1861, ch. 2). Its evaluative 
element states that your options are to be ranked in terms 
of the total amount of happiness their outcomes contain, 
and its deontic element stipulates that the option ranked 
first is right and all others wrong. The resulting version of 
consequentialism, classical utilitarianism, has many well-
known and often criticized first-order moral implications. 
By formulating Evaluative and Deontic differently, we get 
different versions of consequentialism that disagree with 
utilitarianism and with each other about which actions are 
right. The previous consequentialist framework is arguably 
so flexible that, for any plausible ethical view, a version of 
consequentialism can be formulated that is extensionally 
equivalent to it (Dreier 2011, 98). 
 
5 For an overview, see Portmore (2009) 
6 See also Dreier (2011, 97) and Smith (2003, 576). 
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Firstly, many ethical views claim that certain kinds of 
actions are right or wrong. We can generate versions of 
consequentialism that are extensionally equivalent to these 
views by (i) taking the doings of different kinds of actions 
to be constitutive consequences of the relevant actions and 
(ii) by granting that these consequences make outcomes 
better or worse.7 This move, however, is not sufficient to 
capture all ethical views because some views have more 
complex structural features. These include (i) agent-centred 
constraints (cases where you are not permitted to do what 
has the agent-neutrally best consequences), (ii) agent-
centred prerogatives (cases where you are permitted to 
choose a sub-optimal option), and (iii) moral dilemmas 
(cases where all options are prohibited).   
To accommodate ethical views that contain constraints, the 
consequentializers have to rely on agent- and time-relative 
evaluative rankings of options based on their 
consequences.8 So, take a view according to which Ann is 
not allowed to kill an innocent by-stander even when this 
would prevent Ben from killing five others. To formulate a 
version of consequentialism that fits this view, we have to 
claim that, due to her own agential involvement, the 
outcome in which Ann kills the innocent by-stander is 
worse relative to her than the outcome in which Ben kills 
more people even if from the agent-neutral perspective the 
latter option is better. This version of consequentialism 
entails that there are constraints. 
To accommodate agent-centred prerogatives the 
consequentializers can, for example, formulate the deontic 
element in a ‘satisficing’ way.9 Such satisficing views 
stipulate that often you are only required to choose a good 
 
7 See Dreier (1993, 23 and 2011, 98–99). 
8 See Dreier (1993, 22–23 and 2011, 98–104), Louise (2003), and Portmore 
(2009, 330–331). For an objection and a response, see Schroeder (2007) 
and Suikkanen (2009). 
9 See, e.g., Slote (1982). For s discussion of this and other ways of 
consequentializing agent-centred prerogatives, see Suikkanen (2014a). 
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enough option. In order to determine which options are 
good enough, these views then either rely on a threshold of 
how much the value the consequences of permissible 
options must have or state that the value of the permissible 
consequences must be ‘reasonably close’ to the value of the 
outcome of the best option.  
Finally, to accommodate moral dilemmas, the 
consequentializers can, for example, rely on axiologies that 
recognize value incomparability.10 According to them, in 
some situations some options have outcomes that cannot be 
ranked evaluatively (i.e., neither of the outcomes is better 
than the other nor are they equally good). According to the 
resulting versions of consequentialism, there will be cases 
where no action is permissible because there is no option 
that is better than all other alternatives.  
This outline of the consequentializing project suggests that, 
for every plausible ethical view, there is a version of 
consequentialism that is extensionally equivalent to it (the 
debate about whether that actually is the case can continue 
elsewhere). I, more modestly, only wanted to illustrate how 
flexible consequentialism is – how the framework allows us 
to formulate different versions of consequentialism that 
match different ethical views, even those that have 
previously been thought to be non-consequentialist. 
3 The Contractualizing Project 
This section outlines how perhaps also other ethical 
theories are as flexible frameworks as consequentialism. 
Perhaps, for every plausible first-order ethical view, there 
are also versions of contractualism, Kantian ethics, virtue 
ethics, etc. that are extensionally equivalent to it. For 
reasons of space, I focus on just one theory, contractualism.  
Most ethicists associate contractualism with Scanlon’s 
version (Scanlon 1998). Yet, I want to suggest that 
 
10 See, e.g., Dreier (2011, 105–107). For a discussion of different ways of 
consequentializing moral dilemmas, see Suikkanen (2020). 
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contractualism too should be understood as a flexible 
framework in which different versions of the theory can be 
formulated. I take the elements of this framework to be:  
Codes: There is a set of all the mutually exclusive 
moral codes that we could all internalize together.11 
Normative: The outcomes of the general adoption of 
the previous codes can be ranked normatively.  
Deontic: What actions are right and wrong is 
determined by which actions the moral code that is 
normatively ranked first authorizes and forbids. 
For the sake of simplicity, I assume that Codes and Deontic 
are fixed in this general characterisation of contractualism 
– they remain the same across different versions of 
contractualism. I will instead focus on the Normative 
element as the element that allows us to formulate different 
versions of contractualism (exactly like Evaluative allowed 
us to formulate different versions of consequentialism). 
Let me begin from how Scanlon formulated Normative. For 
him, the normative ranking of different moral codes is 
based on reasons, which he argued to be the fundamental 
normative notion (Scanlon 1998, ch. 1 and 192). On 
Scanlon’s view, the general adoption of different codes 
affects what kind of lives individuals come to live and thus 
what kind of standpoints they have (ibid., 203). The 
burdensome elements of their lives then give the 
individuals who bear those burdens reasons to object to the 
moral code under which they live (ibid., 195). The moral 
code to which individuals have the weakest objections is 
then the code that cannot be reasonably rejected (and 
therefore it is ranked first normatively).  
Scanlon also provided a first-order picture of what kind of 
burdensome features of their lives provide individuals 
with reasons to object to the relevant codes. According to 
him, these reasons must be generic reasons not based on 
 
11 Given that ‘act-contractualism’ exists (Sheinman 2011), this element 
could be formulated more generally. However, for reasons of space, I 
will focus on views that are based on moral codes, which I understand 
as different kinds of moral sensitivities rather than as sets of principles 
(Hooker 2000, §3.5 and Scanlon 1998. 198–9). 
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anyone’s particular aims, preferences, or tastes and yet they 
still must be qualities of the person’s own life (ibid., 204). 
Scanlon’s examples included bodily harm, not being able to 
rely on the assurances of others, and not having control 
over what happens to your body (ibid.). Furthermore, 
when we read Scanlon, we get a sense from his examples of 
how strong reasons to object different first-order 
considerations provide. Scanlon thus relied on a certain 
implicit first-order theory of reasons to formulate the 
Normative element of his version of contractualism. This 
theory determines the normative ranking of the different 
moral codes in terms of how strong objections individuals 
can make to them. 
Contractualists need not, however, formulate Normative in 
the same way as Scanlon. Firstly, they could also adopt 
other first-order views of which considerations count as 
reasons to object to different codes and how strong 
objections those reasons ground. Secondly, instead of 
comparing reasons for objecting to different codes, 
contractualists could focus, for example, on which moral 
code everyone has sufficient reason seeing to it that 
everyone accepts (Parfit 2011, 355). Thirdly, contractualists 
could also rely on other normative notions than reasons to 
create the required normative ranking of the moral codes. 
They could rank those codes, for example, in terms of 
which code rational individuals would adopt where 
rationality is understood in either deliberative (Southwood 
2010) or decision theoretic terms (Gauthier 1986). By 
formulating the relevant normative ranking of moral codes 
in these and other ways, we get different versions of 
contractualism according to which different actions are 
right and wrong. 
I then suggest that, as a framework in which different 
versions can be formulated, contractualism is just as 
flexible as consequentialism. Just as for any plausible 
ethical view there is a co-extensive version of 
consequentialism, there will also be a co-extensive version 
of contractualism. My argument to this conclusion has five 
parts, but the basic idea is analogical to consequentializing. 
Just as we get different versions of consequentialism by 
finessing our axiologies, we get different versions of 
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contractualism by finessing our theories of on what 
grounds different individuals can object to moral codes.   
Firstly, to capture ethical views according to which certain 
types of actions are wrong, the ‘contractualizers’ have to 
claim that, when these types of actions are done to a person 
under a moral code that authorizes those actions, that fact 
itself provides the victim a sufficient reason to reject the 
code. So, if an ethical view claims that typing thank-you 
notes is wrong, the corresponding version of 
contractualism states that receiving a typed thank-you note 
is such a burden that it provides a sufficient reason to reject 
any moral code that authorizes typing thank-you notes. 
Secondly, in order to accommodate ethical views that 
recognize constraints, the contractualizers can stipulate 
that, when a code requires you to do a certain kind of an 
action, the fact that you would be doing that action gives 
you a strong reason to object to that code. So, consider the 
case of Ann and Ben from §2. According to a constraint-
recognizing version of contractualism, Ann can object to 
the codes that would permit or even require her to kill the 
innocent by-stander on the grounds of how serious burden 
killing an innocent by-stander herself is. If the 
contractualizers also stipulate that the previous objection is 
stronger than any of the five individuals’ objections are to 
the codes that do not permit or even require saving them 
by killing the innocent by-stander, they have formulated a 
version of contractualism that entails constraints: cases 
where you are not allowed to do what has the agent-
neutrally best consequences.12 
Thirdly, to capture ethical views that recognize agent-
centred prerogatives, the contractualizers can argue that, if 
you frequently lacked freedom to choose between different 
permissible options (some of which are sub-optimal), this 
in itself would count as a burdensome objectionable feature 
of your life (Scanlon 1998: ch. 6). For example, in this 
situation your ability to make autonomous decisions would 
 
12 Scanlon implies that his view is compatible with constraints (Scanlon 
1998, 81–6 and 106–7) though see Parfit (2011, 364–5). For a 
contractualist account of relatively weak deontic restrictions, see 
Brand-Ballard (2004). For a general discussion of how to contractualize 
various deontic distinctions, see Kamm (2007, 470–474). 
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not be recognized. Because of this, you would have a strong 
objection to those codes that do not leave you sufficient 
room to make choices between many different permissible 
options.  
Fourthly, to capture dilemma-containing ethical views, the 
contractualizers can claim that there are situations in which 
all codes that authorize an option can be reasonably 
rejected because there are stronger reasons to object to 
those codes than to the ones that forbid every option. So, in 
the Sophie’s choice situation, there are first-order theories 
of reasons according to which Sophie’s children have very 
strong reasons to reject all the codes that would permit any 
of the options available to Sophie because all these codes 
fail to respect their dignity as equal moral beings.  
The contractualizers can thus formulate different versions 
of contractualism that can accommodate the rightness and 
wrongness of different kinds of actions, constraints, 
prerogatives, and dilemmas. However, they still need to 
address one more ethical view: classical utilitarianism. This 
is because contractualist views are often presented as anti-
utilitarian, as views that rule out utilitarianism as a first-
order ethical view (Scanlon 1998, 234–5). Whilst this is true 
for many versions of contractualism, the contractualist 
framework allows us to formulate versions of 
contractualism that are co-extensive even to classical 
utilitarianism. 
The first alternative is to drop the individualist restriction of 
Scanlon’s contractualism and allow the interpersonal 
aggregation of different objections to moral codes.13 If 
individuals can pool their reasons to object to different 
codes and especially if we restrict the content of the 
aggregated objections to how (un)happy people are, the 
moral code that maximizes the total amount of happiness 
becomes the non-rejectable (i.e., the one to which there are 
the weakest objections). The second alternative is to 
stipulate that individuals can object to the relevant 
principles only from an ex ante perspective from which they 
also know that they are equally likely to come to live as any 
 
13 See Scanlon (1998, 229–30), Ridge (2001), and Parfit (2003, §2). 
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one of the actual individuals.14 As John Harsanyi (1975) 
argued, from this perspective every individual has 
sufficient reason to object to all principles that do not 
maximize their own well-being expectation. Thus, if we 
formulate contractualism in this way, we get a version that 
is extensionally equivalent to utilitarianism. 
If the previous moves are made, then, for any plausible 
ethical view, there will be both a version of 
consequentialism and a version of contractualism that is co-
extensive to it.15 Perhaps it could also be shown that 
Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, etc. are equally flexible. After 
all, we can create extensionally different Kantian first-order 
views by formulating in different ways what constitutes a 
contradiction in universalized willing. Likewise, different 
views of virtues and human flourishing lead to different 
first-order virtue ethical views. However, for reasons of 
space, these possibilities have to be explored elsewhere. For 
the present purposes, it is enough if both consequentialism 
and contractualism are flexible frameworks in which 
different versions can be formulated so that they will 
correspond extensionally to different first-order ethical 
views. The rest of this chapter focuses on the consequences 
of that thought.  
4 Theory Choice in Normative Ethics 
If the traditional ethical theories are flexible frameworks, 
what consequences does this have for normative ethics and 
ethical theorizing? In the next sub-section §4.1, I first argue 
that which ethical theory should be accepted can no longer 
be based on truth or correctness. In §4.2, I will then consider 
the prospects of understanding these ethical theories in a 
new way as methods for doing ethical inquiry and how we 
should choose which one to use. 
4.1 Truth and Correctness 
The first immediate consequence of the flexibility of 
consequentialism and contractualism is that it no longer 
 
14 For a defence of ex ante contractualism, see Frick (2015). 
15 This means that consequentialists and contractualists are not only 
climbing one mountain together but rather they can climb every 
mountain together (Parfit 2011, §64). 
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makes sense to understand these theories as criteria of 
rightness. Those theories, as flexible frameworks, are not 
even in the business of stating under which conditions 
actions are right and wrong. Rather, only the versions of 
consequentialism and contractualism that specify the 
different elements of these frameworks in substantial terms 
can provide a statement of which actions are supposed to 
be right. So, at best, only the fully specified versions of the 
traditional theories could be criteria of rightness. 
Relatedly, it equally makes no longer sense to disagree 
about which of the traditional ethical theories is true or 
correct. There is a traditional project in moral philosophy in 
which the defenders of ethical theories argue against one 
another by presenting counterexamples to their opponents’ 
views, cases in which those views are claimed to have 
unintuitive ethical consequences. Simultaneously, the 
defenders of each view try to explain why the alleged 
counterexamples to their view fail. This project turns out to 
be pointless.  
This is because, on whatever common-sense first-order 
intuitions the alleged counterexamples are based, we now 
know that there will be versions of consequentialism and 
contractualism that match those intuitions. That is 
guaranteed by the flexibility of those theories as structural 
frameworks. And, as far as the other traditional ethical 
theories (Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, etc.) are equally 
flexible, there will not be counterexamples to those theories 
either (though if they are not, then the possibility of 
counterexamples remains).  
This means that, if there is a complete set of the first-order 
ethical verdicts that are objectively true and correct (and I 
have no reason to doubt that there is), there will also be 
versions of consequentialism and contractualism that are 
just as true and correct as that set. After all, those versions, 
whatever they are like, will be extensionally equivalent to 
the correct set of moral verdicts. This is why the question of 
which ethical theory should be accepted cannot be decided 
on the basis of their truth or correctness.  
At this point, I have to address one objection to the previous 
thesis. Douglas Portmore (2009, §6) suggests that, in 
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addition to purely extensional claims about which actions 
are right, traditional ethical theories also make claims about 
what makes different actions right and wrong. If this is 
right, then we could evaluate which ethical theory is true, 
not by focusing on extensional adequateness, but rather by 
considering how plausible claims the view makes about the 
relevant right- and wrong-makers. Following Dreier (2011, 
112–114), I’ll distinguish between two versions of this 
objections.  
Firstly, it could be suggested that ordinary first-order 
ethical views too make claims about what makes different 
actions right and wrong (ibid., 112). For example, one view 
might claim that breaking a promise is wrong because it 
disrespects the promisee as a person whereas another view 
might suggest that it is wrong because it disappoints their 
intentionally created expectations. These two views would 
be conflicting views even if they agreed that breaking 
promises is wrong. The question then is: are there versions 
of consequentialism and contractualism that can capture 
these theories that are extensionally equivalent but 
disagree about the right-makers? If there aren’t, this could 
be considered to count against the given framework.  
Fortunately, the previous two sub-extensionally different 
ethical views can be both consequentialized and 
contractualized.16 The consequentialized version of the first 
view would state that disrespecting the promisee makes 
promise breaking wrong because it is an intrinsically bad 
quality of outcomes that lowers the ranking of the options 
that contain promise-breaking. Likewise, the 
consequentialized version of the second view would claim 
that disappointing the relevant expectations makes 
breaking promises wrong because that, instead of 
disrespect, makes the promise-breaking containing 
outcomes rank low evaluatively.  
Contractualists can likewise capture the first view by 
claiming that disrespecting the promisee makes promise 
breaking wrong because in virtue of that the promisee has 
a sufficiently strong objection to any principle that permits 
breaking a promise. Likewise, the second view can be 
 
16 See Dreier (2011, 112) and Väyrynen (2013, 171). 
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contractualized by stipulating that disappointing the 
promisee’s intentionally created expectations makes 
promise-breaking wrong because it grounds a sufficiently 
strong objection to the principles that would authorize 
breaking a promise. This means that the previous type of 
sub-extensional differences between ethical views can be 
both consequentialized and contractualized and therefore 
they cannot be used to determine which framework is 
correct either.17 
There is, however, also a more difficult version of the 
objection (Portmore 2009, 340; Dreier 2011, 112). It could be 
argued that consequentialism and contractualism 
themselves make conflicting claims about what makes 
actions right and wrong, and therefore only one of the 
frameworks can be correct. On this construal, 
consequentialism would state that the fact that an action 
has the best consequences of the available options is the 
only right-maker. Likewise, contractualism thus 
understood would state that actions are always made right 
by the fact that they are authorized by the non-rejectable 
code. If the consequentialists and contractualists made 
these claims, at best only one of these theories would be 
true. 
The reason why we can set aside these versions of 
consequentialism and contractualism is that they are not 
plausible. This is well-known from the discussions of the 
 
17 It could be objected that consequentialism and contractualism offer 
conflicting views of in virtue of what a given first-order consideration 
is a right- or a wrong-maker of which only one can be true or correct. 
Yet, here the relevant versions of consequentialism and contractualism 
would agree on which actions are right and what makes those actions 
right too and so the ‘active’ ingredients of the views are the same 
(Dreier 2011, 113–114). As a result, it could be argued that the 
disagreement in question is merely a notational one – a verbal one 
concerning how to represent the same normative reality. More 
modestly put, it would be at least a disagreement in metaethics 
concerning what grounds right- and wrong-making relations rather 
than a disagreement in first-order normative ethics, and it is also a 
rather difficult question on what grounds such a disagreement could 
be solved. 
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so-called redundancy objections to contractualism.18 As 
Judith Jarvis Thomson put it (1990, 30 n. 19): 
For my own part, I cannot bring myself to believe 
that what makes it wrong to torture babies to death 
for fun (for example) is that doing this ‘would be 
disallowed by any system of rules for the general 
regulation of behaviour which no one could 
reasonably reject as a basis of informed, unforced 
general agreement’. 
It is more plausible to think that, here too, the relevant 
wrong-maker is something first-order and concrete – that 
the torture hurts the baby or that she will miss out on the 
things that would have made her life good. And, as we just 
saw, there are versions of contractualism that can recognize 
these simple wrong-makers.  
The same is true of consequentialism. I similarly cannot 
bring myself to believe that what makes it wrong to torture 
babies to death for fun is that doing so fails to maximize the 
total amount of goodness. Rather, it is again more plausible 
that the previous first-order considerations are the relevant 
wrong-makers (which, as we saw, can be recognized as 
such by the consequentialists). 
This means that the second version of the objection fails 
too.19 It’s true that there are formulations of 
consequentialism and contractualism that make these 
theories put forward conflicting claims about right-makers. 
These views can be evaluated in terms of truth and 
correctness, but it turns out that they are highly implausible 
and thus probably false. And, so, we still have not found a 
way to evaluate consequentialism and contractualism as 
flexible frameworks for their truth and falsity. And, as far 
as I am aware, there is no other plausible way to do so. This 
is why I want to consider next whether some other 
principle could guide our theory choice in normative ethics. 
 
18 For an overview, see Southwood (2010, ch. 7). 
19 For a different response, see Dreier (2011, 113–4). 
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4.2 Methods of Ethics and Pragmatic Pluralism 
Let us then turn to a different alternative. It would be to 
understand the traditional ethical theories both (i) as 
flexible frameworks in which different versions can be 
formulated to match different ethical views and (ii) also as 
methods of ethical inquiry. Would this be a plausible 
combination of views? 
To explore this question, I will first assume that first-order 
practical ethical questions can be ordered on a spectrum 
based on how difficult we think they are to answer. At one 
end of this spectrum are questions like Thomson’s question 
of whether it is wrong to torture babies to death for fun. 
Here we are completely certain of the answer: of course, it 
is! This answer isn’t merely based on an intuition but rather 
it is a carefully considered fundamental moral conviction 
(that perhaps even counts as substantial knowledge).20 We 
cannot even imagine what it would be for those actions to 
be right.21 Furthermore, there is also wide agreement about 
the matter, and our moral conviction is related to what we 
most fundamentally care about.22  
At the other end of the spectrum are the moral problems to 
which we have no answers. These problems often have to 
do with advances in new biomedical technologies or, say, 
the development of things like artificial intelligence. They 
also arise in Sorites series cases (Dunaway 2017, 39–40). 
Many people are certain that you are not permitted to kill 
one person to save two others even if you are permitted to 
do so to save billion people. If you accept these two claims, 
then there is a range between two and billion where it will 
be impossible to tell whether it would be permissible to kill 
one to save that many people. Finally, between the previous 
ends of the spectrum, there is a whole range of questions 
where we are more or less certain about the answers.  
 
20 For Rawls’s description of carefully considered moral convictions, see 
Rawls (1951, 181–3). In the wide reflective equilibrium, these 
convictions are to be checked against empirical knowledge of the 
origins of our moral intuitions.   
21 See Driver (2008).  
22 Thus, the conviction seems to pass Sidgwick’s four tests (§1; Sidgwick 
1907, 338–42). For the latter point, see Frankfurt (1988) and Korsgaard 
(2009, ch. 7). 
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In order to consider whether the traditional ethical theories 
could be understood as methods to be used in moral 
inquiry, I begin from the moral problems that we can 
answer confidently. My proposal is that our carefully 
considered convictions in these cases constitute ‘moral 
fixed points’.23 I have suggested that, for any plausible first-
order ethical view, there is a version of consequentialism 
and contractualism that is extensionally equivalent to it. In 
this situation, we should use our carefully considered 
convictions as fixed points that enable us both (i) to rule out 
the implausible versions of the previous theories and (ii) to 
formulate and converge on the more plausible ones. Thus, 
in these cases, we should not use the traditional ethical 
theories as deliberation procedures or methods, but rather, 
the other way around, we should rely on our carefully 
considered convictions to formulate the acceptable forms of 
consequentialism and contractualism.  
This, of course, means that in these cases the traditional 
ethical theories do nothing to justify our first-order ethical 
convictions from any ‘Archimedean’ independent 
theoretical perspective (see Hooker 2000, 19–23). Rather, 
the warrant transfers here wholly from our carefully 
considered convictions to the acceptable versions of the 
traditional ethical theories. Despite this, this suggestion has 
two important advantages. 
Firstly, it helps us to explain why we should 
consequentialize and contractualize in the first place. One 
reason for this, as Dreier (2011, 116–7) has suggested, is that 
displaying the pattern of our fundamental moral 
convictions as a version of consequentialism (and 
contractualism) can help us to represent many general and 
interesting structural features of our moral sensitivities 
more clearly.  
For example, consider the Transplant case in which a 
surgeon must decide whether to harvest the organs of a 
healthy orphan to save five other patients (Thomson 1976, 
206). Here most of us are convinced that it would be wrong 
for the surgeon to do that. Yet, within the consequentialist 
 
23 See Cuneo & Shafer-Landau (2014) and especially in this context 
Rawls (1971, 19–20). 
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framework, the versions of consequentialism which can 
accommodate that conclusion have to recognize something 
like the distinction of doing and allowing and/or rely on 
agent-relative evaluative rankings. Similarly, versions of 
contractualism that fit our convictions in this case have to 
recognize objections to moral codes that are not merely 
well-being and death based (as the orphan and the five 
others would have equal objections on those grounds) 
(Kamm 2007, 472). They have to claim that the orphan can 
object, not merely to his own death, but also to how it came 
about compared to how others would die from natural 
causes.  
These examples show how using our basic convictions to 
formulate extensionally adequate versions of 
consequentialism and contractualism can help us to 
represent interesting structural features of those 
convictions more clearly. Yet, proceeding from our 
convictions to acceptable versions of consequentialism and 
contractualism has also another advantage. It can help us 
to respond to the key objections to the thought that the 
traditional ethical theories should be understood as 
methods or deliberation procedures.  
Consider first problem of self-defeatingness. The force of 
that objection derives from the assumption that, if ethical 
theories are deliberation procedures or methods, they are 
to be used as such in every situation, including the ones in 
which we have full certainty. In the light of this 
assumption, of course the traditional ethical theories are 
radically revisionary. They would require us to live our 
lives in a very different way. We would have to constantly 
deliberate in a very theoretical, calculative way. It is no 
surprise that doing so would not make things go well, it 
would not be what flourishing individuals do, and it would 
lead to burdens that would be a reason to reject the 
requirement.  
My proposal avoids this problem: it creates no requirement 
to use ethical theories as deliberation procedures in the 
cases where we are already certain. In fact, it is hard to see 
how the flexible frameworks could be used as deliberation 
procedures in those cases in the first place. This is because 
these theories do not have any first-order consequences 
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before we have formulated their value theories, theories of 
reasons etc. in substantial terms. And, as I have suggested, 
the only way to do that is to rely on our antecedent carefully 
considered moral convictions in the cases of full certainty.  
This helps us to avoid the problems of Sidgwick’s project 
too. Sidgwick seemed to draw highly revisionary egoist 
and utilitarian conclusions about what we are to do even in 
cases where we already had certainty on the basis of 
evaluating the three methods of ethics with his four tests. 
Yet, according to my proposal, in the cases of certainty, our 
carefully considered moral convictions cannot be overruled 
by the ethical theories but rather those convictions will help 
us to formulate the best versions of those theories. 
Let us then turn to the moral problems we currently find 
too difficult. It is here, I believe, we should understand the 
traditional ethical theories as methods of ethical inquiry, 
though in a new way. I do not mean that the traditional 
ethical theories will provide simple step-by-step algorithms 
that anyone could use to solve these problems. Rather, the 
flexible frameworks provided by these theories will 
provide more or less useful ways of thinking about these 
problems.   
In the case of the difficult moral problems, the flexibility of 
the consequentialist and contractualist frameworks allows 
us to formulate different versions of the theories that entail 
different solutions to these problems. In the case of 
consequentialism, these versions of consequentialism will 
be formulated around different views of what makes the 
outcomes of the relevant options good. Likewise, in the case 
of contractualism, the conflicting versions in these cases 
will be based on different first-order theories of which 
features of agents’ lives provide them with sufficiently 
strong reasons to reject different moral codes that could 
govern the relevant cases.  
As a result, when we use the ‘consequentialist method’ to 
approach a given difficult moral problem, we have to focus 
on the question of whether the versions of 
consequentialism that entail different solutions to the moral 
problem are based on generally appealing accounts of final 
value. Likewise, when we use the ‘contractualist method’, 
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we have to focus on the question of whether the relevant 
versions of contractualism that likewise entail the different 
solutions are based on generally appealing accounts of first-
order reasons to object to different moral codes. In both 
cases ultimately, we should be sceptical about the solutions 
that require gerrymandered and wildly implausible 
theories of value or reasons for which nothing else can be 
said except that they provide a certain answer in a 
particular case (Hooker 2000, 4–8). Likewise, we should 
consider it an argument for a given solution to a difficult 
problem if the solution is entailed by a version of 
consequentialism or contractualism that relies on 
independently plausible views of value or reasons.  
We should, however, notice that using these two methods 
to approach difficult moral problems guides us to focus on 
different things and to reason in different ways. Which 
method should we then use if we assume that there is no 
‘true’ or ‘correct’ one? Here, I recommend adopting an 
attitude of pragmatic pluralism. This suggestion has two 
parts. Firstly, I doubt that we can tell which method we 
should use from the arm-chair a priori and before any actual 
moral inquiry. Rather, we should try to solve different 
difficult ethical problems by relying on the previous 
methods and see what works.24 Perhaps it will turn out that 
better arguments for different solutions to the difficult 
problems can be provided by relying on either the 
consequentialist or the contractualist framework.  
However, it might also well be that some problems are 
better approached through different versions of 
consequentialism whereas others through different 
versions of contractualism (or Kantian ethics or virtue 
ethics etc.). Let me illustrate this idea. When it comes to 
climate change, there are extremely difficult ethical 
questions of exactly which climate change policies we 
should adopt. These questions are usually approached 
 
24 By a method that ‘works’, I mean one that can be used for making 
progress in the relevant debate. By progress, I do not mean everyone 
converging on truth on the whole question, but more modestly the 
method being able to provide clarity on the question, and to help us to 
critically evaluate smaller arguments in the domain, to tell us what kind 
of considerations are relevant and how, what kind of distinctions we 
ought to rely on, and so on (Chalmers 2015). 
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within the framework of expected value consequentialism. 
Yet, the ethicists and economists who come to conflicting 
conclusions concerning different climate change policies 
rely on different versions of consequentialism based on 
different axiological assumptions.25 These assumptions are 
different views of risk and uncertainty, the rate at which 
future goods should be discounted, and about whether 
only human well-being has intrinsic value or whether other 
goods such as biodiversity have intrinsic value too. And, 
the ethical debates about these issues seem to provide 
constructive ways for approaching the climate change 
policies within the consequentialist framework.26  
In contrast, it is not clear whether we could make equal 
progress in approaching the large-scale ethical questions 
concerning different climate change policies through the 
contractualist, Kantian and virtue ethical frameworks. One 
reason for this is the different policies affect billions of 
people and whole biosystems in so many complex ways 
(and there is also so much uncertainty) that is not clear how 
all these considerations could even be taken into account in 
the other ethical frameworks. Perhaps for this reason, 
majority of the work in climate change ethics continues to 
be done in the consequentialist framework and there are 
few compelling contractualist (or Kantian or virtue ethical, 
or …) discussions of the central ethical problems in this 
domain.27  
The fact that the consequentialist framework is the most 
useful approach to climate change policies does not, 
however, entail (i) that contractualism would be ‘false’ in 
any way, nor (ii) that the consequentialist framework 
provides the best method for approaching all difficult 
moral problems. Firstly, with (i), even if we have to rely on 
the consequentialist method in answering the previous 
questions, we know that there will also be versions of 
 
25 See Broome (2012, chs. 6 – 10, and especially 97–103). 
26 See, e.g., the essays in Walsh, Hormio and Purves (2016). 
27 There are, of course, some such discussions. For my own 
contractualist discussion, see Suikkanen (2014b) and for a human 
rights-based take, see Caney (2010). Yet, it is difficult to see how such 
accounts could answer the difficult ethical questions concerning exactly 
which climate change policies we should adopt. 
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contractualism that correspond to those solutions. This is 
guaranteed by the ‘contractualizing project’ outlined in §3. 
Secondly, a method that works best in one case need not do 
so elsewhere. For example, one domain of ethical problems 
in which I find the contractualist framework more helpful 
than the consequentialist one is promise-keeping (see 
Scanlon 1998, ch. 7). There are many promises of which we 
are certain that they ought to be kept and many others that 
we know we shouldn’t keep, but there are also many cases 
in which it is difficult to tell whether we ought to keep a 
given promise. These include cases where it is uncertain 
whether a valid promise has been made and cases where 
keeping the promise turns out to be either very demanding 
or conflict with one’s other moral duties. In these cases, it 
seems more useful to consider what kind of consequences 
different options have to the particular individuals 
involved and what kind of objections they could make to 
different alternatives on the basis of those consequences. 
Here, there are only few individuals involved, the 
consequences to each individual are not complex, they take 
place immediately, and there isn’t much uncertainty 
involved either. Here the consequentialist framework 
seems to add unnecessary complexity whereas the 
contractualist framework enables us to focus on the 
relevant factors.  
Yet, this too does not make contractualism the ‘correct’ 
framework. This is because, to whatever solutions to the 
difficult promise-keeping cases we are led via the 
contractualist reasoning, it will be possible to formulate 
versions of consequentialism that fit those conclusions. This 
is again guaranteed by the flexibility of the consequentialist 
framework. Likewise, the fact that the contractualist 
method is helpful in the promise-keeping case does not 
make it any better elsewhere (such as in the climate change 
one).  
I want to make one final observation about these cases and 
the idea of using moral theories as methods to solve them. 
In §1, I noted that students tend to use ethical theories 
poorly as methods whereas applied ethicists who actually 
make progress rarely rely on them. The proposal outlined 
here, fortunately, seems compatible with that observation.  
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Firstly, students often fail to apply the ethical theories in the 
right way. Rather than taking them to be flexible 
frameworks in which different versions can be formulated 
and compared, students take just one, usually the most 
basic version of the theory and apply that version to solve 
the ethical problem that interests them. This overlooks the 
fact that there are different, more sophisticated versions of 
the given theory that provide different solutions to that 
problem. The problem is that students rarely attempt to 
compare the merits of these versions. 
What about the professional ethicists? Admittedly few of 
them explicitly frame their investigations of the first-order 
ethical problems in terms of comparing different versions 
of consequentialism or contractualism. In this respect, the 
outlined methods might still seem untested. It would thus 
be interesting to see whether progress in applied ethics 
could be made by formulating different discussions 
explicitly in the ways suggested above. I can only hope that 
this would have good consequences. 
I suspect, however, that many applied ethicists would reject 
my suggestion because it only adds unnecessary 
complexity to their otherwise fine work. This might well be 
true, but I don’t think it conflicts with the suggestion I have 
made.  This is because it could be argued that much of the 
work in applied ethics already in some implicit form relies 
on the consequentialist and contractualist methods even if 
the relevant discussions are not formulated explicitly as 
comparisons of different versions of consequentialism or 
contractualism. After all, when applied ethicists, for 
example, consider whether some new biomedical 
technology should be made available, at least in some form 
they tend to consider the potential good and bad 
consequences of those technologies and what kind of 
objections different people could make to their introduction 
on the basis of how the technologies would affect them. 
This is why many applied ethicists seem to already be 
applying the consequentialist and contractualist methods 
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in some intuitive, implicit way even if this is not made 
explicit for the reader.28  
As a result, I hope that my proposal can avoid the concern 
that it is to revisionary in terms of what applied ethicists 
actually do. Finally, one more question remains to be 
addressed: What about the third type of moral problems 
which we can answer more or less confidently? My 
suggestion is that, in these cases, we should understand the 
outlined methods of ethics in the light one of the central 
elements of Rawls’s notion of reflective equilibrium – the idea 
that ‘we work from both ends’ (Rawls 1971, 20). When it 
comes to the moral questions we can answer with relative 
confidence, we usually can use our convictions to converge 
on the most plausible versions of consequentialism and 
contractualism. Those versions will, again, only provide 
clearer structural representations of our convictions but 
they do little to justify them.29 Because of this, in ordinary 
life, there isn’t often a need to rely on the traditional ethical 
theories as deliberation procedures. 
Yet, in some cases in which our moral convictions are both 
less certain and also represented to us as substantial 
versions of consequentialism or contractualism, we may be 
surprised by how problematic theories of value or reasons 
are required to formulate those versions of 
consequentialism and contractualism. In these situations, 
we can also come to recognize that the other versions of 
consequentialism and contractualism that match the 
solutions we were originally inclined to reject can be 
formulated by relying on more plausible theories of value 
and reasons. When this happens, the process of comparing 
the relevant versions of the ethical theories and how 
 
28 Let me give two illustrations of this. Firstly, the questions of ideal 
population size in population ethics are standardly approached 
through comparing different theories of value in the consequentialist 
framework (see Greaves 2017). Secondly, even Thomson’s (1971) 
famous defence of abortion and many critical discussions of it could be 
read as evaluations of different views of which personal burdens 
ground sufficient objections to different principles governing abortion. 
29 However, sometimes if the relevant versions of consequentialism and 
contractualism are based on independently plausible general accounts 
of value and reasons we can gain new, additional justification for our 
first-order convictions in these cases too. 
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compelling their elements are can lead us to change our 
moral convictions. In these cases, we thus work from the 
more plausible versions of the relevant theories to 
improved moral convictions.  This means that, as methods, 
the traditional ethical theories can also sometimes lead to 
new ethical discoveries and the rejection of our former first-
order moral views. 
5 Conclusion 
The orthodox view is to think of ethical theories as criteria 
of rightness – as statements of the conditions in which 
actions are right and wrong. Against this orthodoxy, I have 
outlined a new argument for the view that the traditional 
ethical theories would be better understood as methods to 
be used in moral inquiry – as a type of deliberation 
procedures. This argument is based on the idea that the 
traditional ethical theories are flexible frameworks in which 
different ethical views can be formulated as versions of 
those theories. It may well even be that, for any plausible 
ethical view, there are at least versions of consequentialism 
and contractualism that are extensionally equivalent to it.  
I then argued that, in this situation, the flexible frameworks 
provided by the traditional ethical theories cannot be 
understood as criteria of rightness (whereas their versions 
can be understood in that way). I suggested that, as a result, 
these frameworks should be understood as methods – as 
different ways for approaching and solving difficult ethical 
problems. These methods allow us to think about such 
problems through comparing different versions of the 
theories based on different views of value and reasons. 
Through evaluating these underlying assumptions about 
value and reasons, we should be able to make new progress 
with difficult first-order ethical questions. I also suggested 
that perhaps different ethical problems are best approached 
through the frameworks provided by different ethical 
theories.  
26 
 
 
Bibliography 
Brand-Ballard, J. (2004): ‘Contractualism and Deontic 
Restrictions’. Ethics 114: 269–300. 
Brink, D. (1989): Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Butler, J. (1736): A Dissertation upon the Nature of Virtue, 
reprinted in S. Darwall (ed.): Five Sermons. 
Indianapolis, IN, Hackett, 1983. 
Caney, S. (2010): ‘Climate Change, Human Rights, and 
Moral Thresholds’. In S. Humphreys (ed.): Human 
Rights and Climate Change, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 69–90. 
Chalmers, D. (2015): ‘Why Isn’t There More Progress in 
Philosophy?’. Philosophy 90: 3–31. 
Cuneo, T. & Shafer-Landau, R. (2014): ‘The Moral Fixed 
Points: New Directions for Moral Nonnaturalism’. 
Philosophical Studies 171: 399–443. 
Dreier, J. (1993): ‘Structures of Normative Theories’. The 
Monist 76: 22–40. 
Dreier, J. (2011): ‘In Defence of Consequentializing’. Oxford 
Studies in Normative Ethics 1, 97–119. 
Driver, J. (2008): ‘Imaginative Resistance and Psychological 
Necessity’. Social Philosophy and Policy 25: 301–13.  
Dunaway, B. (2017): ‘Ethical Vagueness and Practical 
Reasoning’. The Philosophical Quarterly 67: 38–60. 
Frankfurt, H. (1988): ‘Identification and 
Wholeheartedness’, in his The Importance of What We 
Care about: Philosophical Essays, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 159–77. 
Frick, J. (2015): ‘Contractualism and Social Risk’. Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 43: 175–223. 
Gauthier, D. (1986): Morals by Agreement. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press. 
Greaves, H. (2017): ‘Population Axiology’. Philosophy 
Compass 12: 1–15. 
Harsanyi, J. (1975): ‘Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a 
Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’s 
Theory’. The American Political Science Review 69: 
594–606. 
27 
 
Hooker, B. (2000): Ideal Code, Real World. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Kamm, F. (2007): Intricate Ethics. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
Korsgaard, C. (2009): Self-Constitution. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Louise, J. (2004): ‘Relativity of Value and the 
Consequentialist Umbrella’. The Philosophical 
Quarterly 54: 518–36. 
Mill, J.S. (1861): Utilitarianism. 
Parfit, D. (1984): Reasons and Persons. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Parfit, D. (2003): ‘Justifiability to Each Person’. Ratio 16: 
368–90. 
Parfit, D. (2011): On What Matters, vol. 1. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Portmore, D. (2009): ‘Consequentializing’. Philosophy 
Compass 4: 329–47. 
Rawls, J. (1951): ‘Outline for a Decision Procedure for 
Ethics’. The Philosophical Review 60: 177–92. 
Ridge, M. (2001): ‘Saving Scanlon: Contractualism and 
Agent-Relativity’. The Journal of Political Philosophy 9: 
472–81. 
Scanlon, T.M. (1998): What We Owe to Each Other. 
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. 
Schroeder, M. (2007): ‘Teleology, Agent-Relative Value, 
and the “Good”’. Ethics 117: 265–95. 
Shafer-Landau, R. (2010): The Fundamentals of Ethics. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Sheinman, H. (2011): ‘Act and Principle Contractualism’. 
Utilitas 23: 288–315. 
Sidgwick, H. (1907): The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. London, 
MacMillan. 
Slote, M. (1982): ‘Satisficing Consequentialism’. Satisficing 
Consequentialism’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Suppl. 58: 139–64. 
Smith, M. (2003): ‘Neutral and Relative Value after Moore’. 
Ethics 113: 576–98. 
Southwood, N. (2010): Contractualism and the Foundations of 
Morality. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Suikkanen, J. (2009): ‘Consequentialism, Constraints and 
the Good-Relative-to: a Reply to Mark Schroeder’. 
Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 3: 1–9. 
28 
 
Suikkanen, J. (2014a): ‘Consequentialist Options’. Utilitas 
 26: 276–302. 
Suikkanen, J. (2014b). ‘Contractualism and Climate 
Change’. In M. di Paola and G. Pellegrino (eds.): 
Canned Heat: Ethics and Politics of Climate Change, 
London: Routledge, 115–28. 
Suikkanen, J. (2020): ‘Consequentializing Moral Dilemmas’. 
Journal of Moral Philosophy 17: 261–289. 
Thomson, J.J. (1971): ‘A Defence of Abortion’. Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 1: 47–66. 
Thomson, J.J. (1976): ‘Killing, Letting Die and the Trolley 
Problem. The Monist 59: 204–17. 
Thomson, J.J. (1990): The Realm of Rights. Cambridge, MA, 
 Harvard University Press. 
Väyrynen, P. (2013): ‘Grounding and Normative 
Explanation’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
suppl. 87: 155 – 78. 
Walsh, A., Hormio, S. & Purves, D. (eds.) (2016): The Ethical 
Underpinnings of Climate Economics. London: 
Routledge. 
 
